2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

29 April 2010

Original: English

New York, 3-28 May 2010

Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament"

Report submitted by Japan

In accordance with subparagraph 12 of paragraph 15 in the chapter on Article VI of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Government of Japan submits its report on the measures it has taken to implement Article VI of the NPT and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

1. Contribution to the 2010 NPT Review Process

On March 23, the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia submitted a "New Package of Practical Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation Measures for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)" to the office of the United Nations Secretary-General as a working paper for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

This package was confirmed by the foreign ministers of both countries as a follow-up item in the Joint Statement by the Australia-Japan Foreign Ministers released at the ministers' meeting (held in Perth) and entitled "Towards a World without Nuclear Weapons". The package is the result of serious considerations being made by both governments while referencing the report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND).

The ICNND was launched in September 2008 as a joint initiative between the Governments of Japan and Australia and as an independent enterprise involving various eminent individuals, and published a report in December 2009 with action oriented recommendations and agendas, including "A New International Consensus on Action for Nuclear Disarmament", which has been submitted to the present Conference for its reference.

Please recycle

2. Commitment to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles

The Government of Japan continues to firmly commit itself to the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles", which describes the policy of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Successive Cabinets of Japan, including the incumbent cabinet under Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, have repeatedly articulated that Japan will continue to uphold these principles.

3. Efforts for the early entry-into-force of the CTBT

Japan attaches great importance to the early entry into force of the CTBT, which constitutes one of the major pillars of the NPT regime. "Japan's initiative to promote the entry into force of the CTBT" was introduced by Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada at the 6th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in September 2009, to intensify Japan's efforts to engage with Annex 2 states that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty by taking every opportunity, including meetings between heads of states, to accelerate our efforts to advance the establishment of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and to cooperate with states concerned in the area of maintenance of IMS facilities. In accordance with the initiative, Japan has made various efforts, including the following:

- Prime Minister Hatoyama, when he visited India in December 2009, raised and discussed the CTBT issue with his Indian counterpart and as a result the Joint Statement by both Prime Ministers issued afterword included a reference to the CTBT.

- To promote the early ratification by the Annex II States as well as to promote the establishment of the IMS, in March 2010, the Government of Japan invited government officials from two non-ratification states to visit facilities of the International Monitoring System hosted by Japan and to exchange views on the treaty with relevant Japanese authorities.

- As its technical assistance to developing countries in supporting the development of the IMS, from January to March 2010, Japan invited 11 administrative officers from various countries, who are expected to play global seismological network for nuclear tests, to attend its global seismological observation training course in order to have opportunities to acquire knowledge and advanced techniques of global seismological observation.

4. Activities in preparation for the commencement of Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations

The Government of Japan gives emphasis to the importance and urgency of the commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Japan has been making its utmost efforts to break the current stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), thereby realizing the early commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. Japan contributed at the CD together with other countries to the adoption of a programme of work in May 2009 that included the decision to negotiate a FMCT. In August 2009, Japan hosted a seminar on an FMCT in Geneva together with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), inviting experts from the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) and Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). In September 2009, Japan

together with Canada and the Netherlands submitted to the CD as an official document the document prepared by the IPFM entitled "A Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, with article-by-article explanations" in order to provide the Member States of the CD with useful reference material in the prospective negotiations of an FMCT.

It is regrettable that since the adoption of a programme of work in 2009 the actual negotiations has yet to start. Japan appealed to relevant states of the CD members to agree to commence negotiations on an FMCT without delay on a number of occasions, including at the foreign ministerial level. In October 2009, Foreign Minister Okada visited Pakistan and discussed with his counterpart on possible cooperation for the early commencement of FMCT negotiations.

5. Submission of Resolutions on Nuclear Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly

Every year since 1994, the Government of Japan has submitted its resolution on nuclear disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly.

In 2009, taking into consideration the recent international situation surrounding nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, Japan once again submitted its draft resolution on nuclear disarmament to the UN General Assembly. On 2 December 2009, the draft resolution was adopted at the Plenary Session of the United Nations General Assembly by an overwhelming majority of 171 votes in favour.

Although the situation surrounding nuclear disarmament remains challenging, in response to the political will of a large majority of the international community, which was expressed through the adoption of this resolution, Japan intends to pursue its various diplomatic efforts to maintain and reinforce the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime based on the NPT.

6. Cooperation for denuclearization in Russia

At the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, G8 leaders announced "the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction" to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. The Government of Japan committed itself, for the purpose of this Partnership, to make a contribution amounting to over 200 million US dollars, out of which 100 million is to be allocated to the G8 disposition program of Russian surplus weapons-grade plutonium and the rest to projects for dismantling decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines. Since then Japan extended cooperation to Russia and completed the dismantlement of six decommissioned nuclear submarines. Furthermore, based on the decision in 2006, Japan's preparation has been made for cooperation for the construction of an On-shore Storage Facility for Reactor Compartments at Razvoynik Bay.

Building on the completion of dismantling six decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Russian Far East by the end of 209, Japan is considering additional areas for bilateral cooperation.

7. Efforts to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education

Since 1983, the Government of Japan has invited more than 700 participants in the UN disarmament fellowship programme to Japan, including the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This has provided these young officials, who will be responsible for future disarmament diplomacy, with an opportunity to witness the horrendous and long-lasting consequences caused by the atomic bombs. Japan will continue to contribute to this programme.

Japan believes that the international community should be well informed of the destructive effects of nuclear weapons. In accordance with the wish of the people of Japan that such weapons never be used again, the Government of Japan has supported, on a number of occasions, the efforts of local governments and NGOs in foreign countries to organize exhibitions relating to atomic bombs.

In the margins of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference in 2009, Japan hosted a disarmament and non-proliferation education seminar on practical ways and tools to raise public awareness through education and its role in strengthening the NPT. The picture book related to the experience of the atomic bombing, *On That Summer Day*, was distributed to participants at the conference.

Within the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Niigata, a session on the role of civil society and mass media was held with prominent educators in August 2009.

Japan hosted a reception and concert together with the Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA) of the United Nations on 3 May 2010, the first day of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, in honour of the Hibakusha (people who survived the 1945 atomic bombings of Japan) and their work with young people to raise awareness of the dangers of nuclear weapons.

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

3 May 2010

Original: English

New York, 3-28 May 2010

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by New Zealand

Article I

1. New Zealand views the commitment of nuclear-weapon States not to contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or explosive devices under this article as a core component of broader nuclear non-proliferation efforts. This commitment is also important in the context of the threat of the acquisition of such items by non-State actors.

Article II

2. New Zealand is in full compliance with its commitments as contained in this article. Its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty are legislated in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987. New Zealand's concerns about compliance by other non-nuclear-weapon State parties to the Treaty have been expressed in various forums, including at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Article III

3. New Zealand's safeguards agreement with IAEA came into force on 29 February 1972. New Zealand concluded an additional protocol to the agreement on 24 September 1998. In 2001, IAEA assessed New Zealand to be in full compliance with all its safeguards commitments. With no nuclear weapons, no nuclear energy generation, no nuclear reactors and no production of uranium or other relevant material, New Zealand has only very minor activities subject to safeguards. It is supportive of IAEA's decision and efforts to modify the small quantities protocol, to address weaknesses in the safeguards system identified by IAEA.

4. New Zealand applies export controls to materials and dual-use goods that can be used in a nuclear weapons programme. It coordinates these measures with other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which New Zealand joined in 1994.

10-34016 (E) 110510

Please recycle

Article IV

5. New Zealand reaffirms the inalienable right of States parties to peaceful nuclear technology, as long as it is exercised in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty.

6. New Zealand has been active at such forums as the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference in promoting close attention to the safe transport of radioactive materials and radioactive waste. It is concerned that there be the highest possible safety standards and that they be applied fully, that coastal and other interested States receive notification in advance of shipments, and that adequate liability arrangements be in place.

Article V

7. New Zealand supports the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference that article V should be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

8. New Zealand ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in March 1999 and enacted it in the Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999. A ban on nuclear testing is also included in the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987. New Zealand actively supports efforts to achieve the entry into force of the Treaty. At the General Assembly in 2009, New Zealand, with Australia and Mexico, was a core sponsor of resolution 64/69, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", which urged all States that have not yet done so to ratify the Treaty without delay.

Article VI

9. New Zealand takes very seriously the obligations under article VI, the commitments adopted in the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and the 13 practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference.

10. With its partners in the New Agenda Coalition, New Zealand has worked hard to promote negotiations in good faith relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. In this context, it draws strength from the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

11. At the General Assembly in 2009, New Zealand, with the New Agenda Coalition, was a lead sponsor of resolution 64/57, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", which highlighted the central role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and called upon States to abide fully by their commitments.

Thirteen steps

Step 1

12. New Zealand ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in March 1999, having taken an active part in its negotiation. At the General Assembly in 2009, New Zealand was a core sponsor of resolution 64/69 on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which reiterated calls for universal ratification of that

Treaty. Pending the Treaty's entry into force, New Zealand has been active in the establishment of an international monitoring system and has set up six monitoring stations on New Zealand territory. It cooperates closely with Fiji, the Cook Islands and Kiribati on the installation of monitoring stations within the Pacific region.

Step 2

13. New Zealand endorsed a joint ministerial statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2009, which called for "continuing and sustained voluntary adherence to a moratorium" on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the Treaty's entry into force. New Zealand worked with Pacific countries to put in place the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which bans nuclear testing. In 1987, it also established a New Zealand nuclear-free zone, with the passage of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act.

Step 3

14. New Zealand strongly supported the programme of work adopted by the Conference on Disarmament on 29 May 2009, which would have seen a negotiation commencing on a fissile material treaty and substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and outer space. It remains disappointed that the Conference was unable to implement its programme of work in 2009 and that it has been unable to adopt a further programme of work in 2010. New Zealand will continue to support moves to overcome this blockage. Commencement of negotiations on a fissile material treaty without preconditions would make a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Step 4

15. New Zealand strongly supported the programme of work adopted by the Conference on Disarmament on 29 May 2009, which would have seen a negotiation commencing on a fissile material treaty and substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and outer space.

Step 5

16. New Zealand has argued, in partnership with the New Agenda Coalition, that irreversibility in nuclear disarmament, nuclear reductions and other related nuclear arms control measures is imperative. New Zealand and the New Agenda Coalition were core sponsors of General Assembly resolution 64/57, which reaffirmed that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes requiring urgent irreversible progress on both fronts.

Step 6

17. New Zealand, in partnership with the New Agenda Coalition, urges States to live up to the unequivocal undertaking jointly agreed at the 2000 Review Conference on the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. This undertaking remains extant. New Zealand has reminded States through various statements of their obligations in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The unequivocal undertaking on the part of all Treaty signatory States is a foundation on which the New Agenda Coalition continues to build.

Step 7

18. New Zealand welcomes the recent signature by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation of a new strategic arms reduction treaty (START) and urges both sides to ratify the treaty as soon as possible. New Zealand emphasizes through the New Agenda Coalition, however, that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible destruction of weapons; they are only an interim step towards the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Step 8

19. New Zealand supported the Trilateral Initiative among the United States of America, the Russian Federation and IAEA.

Step 9

20. New Zealand supports the full range of measures outlined in this step and remains committed to achieving progress on these measures at the 2010 Review Conference.

21. New Zealand was pleased to promote a resolution at the General Assembly in 2008, along with Chile, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland, calling for action to lower the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems. Resolution 63/41, entitled "Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems" attracted a strong level of support. New Zealand will be looking to build on this solid foundation in both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and United Nations contexts and has submitted a working paper to the 2010 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.10) containing recommendations to take this issue forward.

22. New Zealand strongly believes that greater transparency by the nuclear-weapon States on their implementation of article VI through systematic reporting would help build international confidence and foster a climate conducive to further progress on disarmament. In this connection, it has submitted a working paper with Australia calling for systematic article VI reporting by all Non-Proliferation Treaty States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States (see (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.40).

Step 10

23. New Zealand recognizes and welcomes the fact that all non-nuclear-weapon States have already accepted full controls on fissile materials. These controls are verified and administered by IAEA. New Zealand urges nuclear-weapon States to adopt similar commitments in this area and notes that the New Agenda Coalition's working paper for the 2010 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.8) contains a recommendation to this effect.

24. New Zealand supports the early negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material or other nuclear explosive devices. It supports efforts currently under way in the Conference on Disarmament to secure negotiations on a fissile material treaty.

Step 11

25. The New Zealand Government engages in a wide range of disarmament work relating to weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. Through active membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, it campaigns for progress towards the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction. New Zealand also played a leading role in international efforts to better regulate the use of certain conventional weapons, in particular in the development of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which New Zealand ratified on 22 December 2009 and which will enter into force on 1 August 2010. There is close cooperation between New Zealand and its Pacific neighbours on efforts to reduce and control the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and New Zealand remains strongly committed to implementing the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and to a successful negotiation of an arms trade treaty. New Zealand also belongs to four major export control regimes, namely the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Step 12

26. New Zealand submitted a report to each of the Preparatory Committees for the eighth review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty setting out its progress with regard to each article of the Treaty (see NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/17, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/11 and Corr.1, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/10).

Step 13

27. New Zealand has given strong support to a system of strengthened IAEA safeguards, including in regional disarmament discussions. The IAEA safeguards system is an essential component of the global non-proliferation regime. IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are meeting their undertakings under the Treaty and provide a mechanism for States to demonstrate their compliance. Universal application of the integrated safeguards system, including the additional protocols, would promote collective security, and New Zealand calls upon all States that have not yet done so to conclude such agreements at the earliest possible date.

Article VII

28. New Zealand is a staunch advocate of the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in contributing to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It is a full party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 1985 (the Treaty of Rarotonga, also enacted in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987). All the independent countries of the South Pacific are now covered by the Treaty, and four of the nuclear-weapon States (the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, China, France and the Russian Federation) have ratified protocols giving security assurances to the region. The United States has signed the protocols.

29. New Zealand was pleased to work with Brazil in the General Assembly to promote resolution 64/44, entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas". As a result of the welcome entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba on 15 July 2009, all nuclear-weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas are now in force.

Article VIII

30. New Zealand supports the text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as it stands and will participate fully in the eighth Review Conference of the Treaty in 2010.

Article IX

31. New Zealand continues to emphasize the importance of the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and calls upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States in accordance with article IX.

32. The withdrawal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its non-compliance with IAEA inspections are of concern to New Zealand. New Zealand strongly supports the Six-Party Talks and hopes that this process will eventually lead the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to active membership of the Treaty, meet its Treaty obligations and resume cooperation with IAEA.

Article X

33. New Zealand recognizes the sovereign right of all States parties to withdraw from the Treaty in accordance with the provisions of article X. It believes that the issue of the continuation of safeguards on nuclear material and equipment remaining in the territory or under the control of the withdrawing party should be addressed.

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

3 May 2010
English
Original: Russian

National report on the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by the Russian Federation

Introduction

1. This report has been prepared for the eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and contains information on the implementation of its articles by the Russian Federation over the period that has elapsed since the seventh Review Conference was held in 2005.

2. The indefinitely extended Treaty is a time-tested instrument that for the past 40 years has effectively averted the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, allowed further progress towards nuclear disarmament and guaranteed the development of broad international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

3. Recent years have clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of the balanced structure of obligations of the States parties to the Treaty. All States — large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear — need this Treaty.

4. The urgency of taking effective non-proliferation measures on the basis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is also dictated today by the danger of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists. This means that we need to strengthen the international "safety net" that makes it possible to manage such risks in advance.

5. The international community's current concern about existing global challenges with respect to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was highlighted during the United Nations Security Council summit of 24 September 2009, which was a positive prelude to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Security Council resolution 1887 (2009), which was adopted at the summit, confirmed the most important thing: that all the new challenges to the non-proliferation regime, including the emergence of "black" nuclear markets, can and should first be addressed within the Non-Proliferation Treaty framework. The Russian Federation is ready to engage in close international partnership in this area.

6. The tasks of countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be dealt with in strict compliance with the norms of international law and with due account taken of the legitimate development and security interests of all States. The Treaty should therefore be fully and effectively implemented in years to come. In this regard we believe that the 2010 Review Conference should focus on a

Please recycle

comprehensive and objective review of every aspect of implementation of the Treaty, reaffirm its viability as the most important tool for averting the threat of nuclear-weapon proliferation and reiterate the commitment of the States parties to fulfil their obligations, as well as agree on a joint "package" of effective and feasible steps towards further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime in order to make the Treaty universal.

7. As a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and one of its depositaries, the Russian Federation is consistent in fulfilling its obligations under the Treaty and confirms its strong and unfailing support for it.

8. The role of the Russian Federation in ensuring implementation of, and compliance with, the provisions and articles of the Treaty is described below.

Articles I and II

9. The Russian Federation, as a nuclear-weapon State, strictly complies with its obligations under article I of the Treaty not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly. The Russian Federation never in any way assists, encourages, or induces any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

10. The Russian Federation believes that strict compliance with article II of the Treaty is one of the main guarantees against the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States.

Article III

11. Application of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards under this article of the Treaty is an important prerequisite for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and an assurance of the implementation of their obligations by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

12. The Russian Federation supports the efforts of IAEA in this field and considers it essential to further strengthen the verification role of the Agency, including the legal, organizational and technical aspects of that role. In this context, the universal conclusion of additional protocols to IAEA safeguards agreements is particularly important, and the Russian Federation urges States that have not yet signed or ratified an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible.

13. The Russian Federation ratified its Additional Protocol in 2007 (Federal Act No. 227-FZ of 2 October 2007).

14. Additional protocols are aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States by detecting possible undeclared activities. The introduction of integrated safeguards is essential for improving the technical and economic effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system.

15. The existence of an additional protocol should be one of the factors to be taken into account when considering nuclear export possibilities. At present the Russian

Federation is willing to regard it as one of the conditions for transferring sensitive nuclear technology and equipment.

16. In order to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, the Russian Federation provides the Agency with financial assistance for carrying out its verification role through a national programme of scientific and technical support for safeguards. In the 26 years of the programme's existence, a significant number of studies have been completed, aimed at strengthening the technical database of the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA secretariat and providing new methods of measurement as well as training materials and information sources for its staff.

17. The programme currently covers a range of work that includes analyses in Russian laboratories of environmental samples collected by IAEA inspectors, training courses in modern methods of non-destructive analysis and in accounting for and control of nuclear materials, inspections of gas centrifuge enrichment plants and the development of new technologies for the detection of undeclared nuclear activities.

18. With the large-scale development of civilian nuclear energy around the world and the emergence of countries that did not previously possess it, there is an increased risk of the proliferation of technologies that can be used to obtain weapons-grade nuclear materials. The Russian Federation and other Group of Eight (G-8) States have developed, and adopted in national legislation, strict but objective criteria governing transfers to non-nuclear States of the most sensitive nuclear equipment and technology, such as for uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The most important criterion is that the importing State must be a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. With respect to uranium enrichment technology, it is transferred only when appropriate and without revealing basic elements that could be diverted to the production of weapons-grade material. We are working on the universal acceptance of these criteria in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

19. The Russian Federation regards the strengthening of multilateral export control regimes as one of the most important instruments to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and technology. Enhancing their efficiency and transparency, as well as involving countries possessing relevant technologies in their operation would, in our view, prevent unauthorized transfers of controlled nuclear items and technology.

20. The national export control system of the Russian Federation is based on control lists and export regulations for the listed items which were established in conformity with the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. We have supported their activities ever since they were created and we believe that they have defined an agreed procedure for the transfer of controlled products without infringing upon the legitimate rights of States to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. The Russian Federation seeks further dialogue and constructive interaction with all countries, including those outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in order to assist them in creating and improving national systems of nuclear export control.

21. The Russian Federation attaches great importance to coordinating international efforts to address the risks of nuclear proliferation. It supports consistent and universal implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which is aimed at countering "black markets" in weapons of mass destruction and preventing

such weapons, related materials, technology and their means of delivery from falling into the hands of non-State actors, in particular terrorist organizations. The Russian Federation takes an active part in the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for its effective implementation.

22. The Russian Federation participates in the IAEA programme to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Our country, with the support of the Agency, organizes international training courses for experts in physical protection.

23. At present, a great deal has already been done to establish an effective international "safety net" to prevent nuclear weapons and materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. It should be noted, in this context, that IAEA has been making significant systematic efforts to strengthen the physical nuclear security regime worldwide. In this connection, we note the successful implementation of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009.

24. One of the most important areas of work is the development by IAEA of a series of publications on physical nuclear security, including one on the goals and basic principles of physical nuclear security, and also the Agency's recommendations, including the revised version of the document entitled "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities" (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)). Russian experts participate actively in the preparation of these documents.

25. The training of experts in physical protection is extremely important. IAEA training courses on physical protection are conducted regularly in the Russian Federation at the Interdepartmental Special Training Centre in Obninsk. Eighteen IAEA training courses have been held since 2001, providing training to over 300 foreign experts. A regional training course on the physical protection of research reactors was held at Tomsk Polytechnic University.

26. Particularly noteworthy is the programme for the maintenance of the IAEA database on illegal trafficking in nuclear materials and radioactive substances. The Russian Federation participates actively in the exchange of information and reports officially to IAEA on incidents that have occurred in its territory.

27. Work at IAEA is currently being conducted on the basis of the Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-2013, which focuses on strengthening physical nuclear security in order to avert possible incidents of nuclear terrorism. While stressing that the physical protection of nuclear material is the priority, it is also necessary to ensure the safety and security of radioactive substances and sources. In order to counter the radiological threat, activities for the protection of this type of material should be conducted at a new, higher level. Given that the threat of terrorism is international in nature, we consider it necessary to strengthen multilateral and bilateral mechanisms for cooperation to address that threat.

28. On 6 July 2009, the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States adopted a joint statement on nuclear cooperation in which they confirmed their commitment to strengthening their cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and stop acts of nuclear terrorism. Building upon previous joint efforts, experience and achievements, they declared an intent to broaden and deepen long-term cooperation to further increase the level of security of nuclear facilities around the world. This includes plans to continue the repatriation of spent highly

enriched uranium fuel from research reactors, the development of new types of low-enriched uranium fuel for them and the possible conversion of research reactor cores in third countries. We invite all IAEA member States to join in this work.

29. The Russian Federation has made a crucial decision that, starting in 2010, it will make a significant voluntary contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. We expect that this contribution will help to further strengthen the physical nuclear security regime.

30. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism announced in 2006 by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States is making a significant contribution to this work. The Initiative is now taking on a global dimension. Seventy-nine States and four observer organizations (IAEA, the European Union, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) have already joined. This is a positive example of how we can come together in the world today to combat new challenges and threats.

31. Such key international instruments as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Amendment to this Convention and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism serve as a basis for joint action. The Russian Federation has ratified these conventions, including the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We consider that the entry into force of the Amendment will make it possible to strengthen substantially the international physical nuclear security regime. Progress is hampered, however, by the fact that most States parties to the Convention have not yet accepted the Amendment.

32. The Russian Federation considers that ensuring the security and safety of radioactive sources is an important means of preventing the uncontrolled proliferation of hazardous materials used to produce the "dirty bomb". We support multilateral efforts in this area. We support IAEA activities aimed at ensuring secure handling of radioactive sources. We commend the adoption of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the formulation of the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. The Russian Federation is assisting IAEA in drafting the International Catalogue of Sealed Radioactive Sources and Devices, which also contributes to enhancing control over them.

33. The Russian Federation, as a major producer, consumer and exporter of radioactive sources, is actively working to establish an export/import control regime for these sources. We are taking steps to harmonize national norms and regulations with international principles.

34. The Russian Federation has elaborated and put in place a sophisticated national legislative and regulatory framework for handling radioactive materials which makes it possible to reliably ensure their transportation security and meets all IAEA requirements. We are in favour of strengthening the regime governing the transportation of such materials which has been adopted by the international community. However, we consider that it should not result in the erection of artificial barriers which are often incompatible with universally recognized norms of international law.

Article IV

35. The Russian Federation believes that in the immediate future there is no alternative to the further development and expansion of the use of civilian nuclear energy around the world.

36. Energy consumption across the world is growing rapidly. In the second half of the twenty-first century, stocks of oil and natural gas will be virtually exhausted. Emissions of greenhouse gases into the planet's atmosphere must be drastically reduced. In practical terms, this problem can be solved only through the development of nuclear energy.

37. The Russian Federation consistently advocates broader access of the NPT States parties to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and promotes international cooperation in this sphere. We believe that it is crucially important to make further efforts to enhance the role and authority of IAEA, a competent and responsible organization which provides for such cooperation on a global scale. This will make it possible to strike the necessary balance between harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

38. The further development of nuclear energy and its large-scale use for the purposes of economic development require a systemic approach to tackling new fundamental and complex tasks. It was with these issues in mind that, at the United Nations Millennium Summit, the President of the Russian Federation proposed an initiative on energy provision for the sustainable development of humankind and radical ways to address the issues of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the environmental protection of planet Earth. In line with this initiative IAEA is implementing the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). Its primary objective is to create nuclear energy systems that are economically competitive, environmentally safe and capable of reducing the risk of proliferation and ensuring the sustainable development of civilization.

39. We welcome the results and the positive direction of the work under INPRO. We support the new approach adopted by the Department of Nuclear Energy of IAEA in organizing working meetings with national delegations from INPRO participating States. At the first such meeting, which was held in January 2009 in Moscow, a range of issues connected with the implementation of the project were discussed with representatives of the IAEA secretariat.

40. We support the efforts of the Agency's secretariat to ensure budgetary funding for the project. The Russian Federation has decided for the first time to provide long-term financing for the project for 2008-2012. It will make an annual contribution of 23 million roubles. We believe that this funding will make it possible to plan the implementation of the project and set tasks for the future.

41. INPRO makes it possible to bring together all interested participating States — both those that possess and those that use the technologies in question — in order to explore together ways of meeting the energy needs of the participating States.

42. In the future the INPRO platform could become the basis for new types of partnership through which IAEA member States could work together to create favourable conditions for the introduction of innovative nuclear energy systems.

43. The number of countries participating in the project has reached 28, in addition to the European Commission, and the fact that some of the participating countries are also involved in a United States-led programme — Generation IV International Forum — calls for closer interaction between these two projects. The Russian Federation acceded to the Generation IV Framework Agreement on 30 July 2009.

44. The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project is yet another example of the Russian Federation's successful participation in multilateral cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. A unique engineering project has been developed for the reactor, a site has been chosen and practical work on implementation has begun.

45. The Russian Federation's involvement in the construction of ITER serves its long-term scientific, economic and political interests in developing nuclear energy and is a logical step for the Russian Federation on the way to mastering thermonuclear technology. As part of its commitment, the Russian Federation will manufacture and deliver to the construction site unique equipment for the reactor's main systems. The Russian Federation is fulfilling all of its obligations, including the manufacture of superconductors, in full compliance with the high standards of the ITER project.

46. Analysis of the technical aspects of promising innovations can be used to investigate problems and the process of establishing an international nuclear energy structure.

47. The inalienable right of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, under article IV of the Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes presupposes the ability to develop a national nuclear fuel cycle, some elements of which are highly sensitive with respect to non-proliferation. It is therefore necessary to guarantee reliable conditions for the implementation of national nuclear programmes by resolving the related non-proliferation issues.

48. The Russian Federation believes it is essential to create an environment that would limit the spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies while not hampering the development of a large-scale nuclear energy industry.

49. We consider that this work could be based on the development and implementation of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, which would offer an economically sound and feasible alternative to developing every element of the cycle at the national level.

50. Tackling the nuclear fuel cycle problem on an international basis would be advantageous from the point of view of the economy, the environment and security, as well as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We welcome the results of the work done by the IAEA expert group to consider possible international approaches to sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies.

51. A number of initiatives have been proposed in recent years in this area at the national and multilateral levels. In January 2006, the President of the Russian Federation proposed working jointly to develop a global nuclear energy infrastructure and to establish international nuclear fuel cycle service centres. In 2007, as a first practical contribution to the implementation of this approach, the Russian Federation, in partnership with Kazakhstan, established the International

Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) at Angarsk. Armenia and Ukraine have also joined the Centre.

52. In January 2008, we officially informed IAEA that IUEC had been listed as one of the Russian nuclear fuel cycle enterprises to which IAEA safeguards could be applied. In 2008, IUEC obtained all the necessary permits and licences to operate as a supplier of products and services.

53. We are grateful that IAEA has welcomed the Russian initiative. We concur with IAEA that the Centre is capable not only of resolving the issue of guaranteed access to nuclear fuel cycle services but also of ensuring nuclear fuel supplies from a guaranteed reserve of low-enriched uranium in response to IAEA requests.

54. The establishment of a guaranteed reserve is an alternative to the expensive option of establishing all the elements of the nuclear fuel cycle at the national level.

55. On 27 November 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2009/81 concerning the Russian initiative to establish a reserve of low-enriched uranium to supply IAEA for its member States. Fourteen States sponsored the resolution.

56. The adoption of the resolution paved the way for an agreement between the Russian Federation and IAEA providing for the establishment in the Russian Federation of a 120-ton physical reserve of five-per-cent-enriched uranium.

57. On 29 March 2010, the Director General of Rosatom, Sergei Kirienko, and the Director General of IAEA, Yukiya Amano, signed the agreement.

58. The Russian proposal is based on article IX of the IAEA Statute. There is no breach or infringement of the rights of IAEA member States, including the right to develop their own nuclear fuel cycle production capability. In other words, in order for them to receive low-enriched uranium from the guaranteed reserve, they are not required to waive the right to establish and develop their own fuel cycle. We are not proposing such a condition. The guaranteed reserve is a response to the concerns of those who fear that they will become fully dependent on nuclear fuel market conditions or on the political will of certain States.

59. Our proposal for the establishment of a reserve of low-enriched uranium was prepared on the basis of the following considerations. The fundamental guarantee of a reliable supply of nuclear fuel is a normally functioning market in which both suppliers and consumers meet their contractual obligations. The purpose of a guaranteed reserve is to provide nuclear fuel to consumers in the event that they face insurmountable political difficulties in obtaining low-enriched uranium that are unrelated to non-proliferation issues.

60. There will be no need for additional IAEA budget expenditure or contributions from IAEA member States. The Russian Federation will bear the costs associated, inter alia, with the production of the reserve, its storage and maintenance, and the application of IAEA safeguards. The State receiving the material will pay the current market price for the material supplied. The guaranteed reserve will not undermine the existing market for low-enriched uranium.

61. The establishment and use of the guaranteed reserve is governed by two agreements. One is an agreement between the Russian Federation and the Agency on the provision of a reserve of low-enriched uranium in accordance with article IX of

the IAEA Statute. The other is a model agreement between IAEA and potential recipient States.

62. The mechanism for supplying low-enriched uranium from the guaranteed reserve is triggered by a decision of the Director General of IAEA, and the uranium is delivered immediately at his request. There is no need for the IAEA Board of Governors to discuss each individual delivery. Neither the Russian Federation nor any other State has any influence over the decision of the IAEA Director General.

63. When a member State of IAEA concludes an agreement with the Agency for the supply of low-enriched uranium, the following conditions must be met from the point of view of the Russian Federation's domestic legislation and international obligations: the nuclear materials must not be used for purposes relating to the development of nuclear weapons; nuclear and physical safety must be ensured; the nuclear material must remain under IAEA safeguards throughout its use in the recipient country; and the material must be used only for the declared purpose, that is, to produce electricity at a specific nuclear power station.

64. The material may be supplied to any non-nuclear IAEA member State that is not in breach of its safeguards agreement and has placed all its peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.

65. The Russian proposal does not conflict with other well-known initiatives and in no way competes with them.

66. In March 2005, the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation adopted a law ratifying the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. The Russian Federation thus acknowledged the primacy of international law in regulating civil liability for nuclear damage. This step will facilitate our cooperation with other countries with regard to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

67. The Russian Federation attaches great importance to ensuring the safety of its nuclear facilities, viewing it as a condition sine qua non for developing the nuclear energy industry. It is an active party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. As mandated by the Convention, the Russian Federation prepared national reports reflecting its compliance with the obligations to ensure nuclear safety in the country and submitted them at the meetings held in 2005 and 2008 for the review of national reports.

68. We attach great importance to the IAEA programme of technical assistance and cooperation. The Russian Federation makes and will continue to make full voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund. We are in favour of retaining the existing funding mechanism through assessments of member States in their national currency in an amount determined by the United Nations scale of assessments in accordance with established practice. Over the course of many years the Russian Federation has actively cooperated with the Agency in implementing projects that seek effective use of applied nuclear technology in areas that are important for developing the economies of IAEA member States.

69. The Russian Federation has expanded its participation in safety- and security-related projects, including projects dealing with the safety of nuclear facilities, radiation security and the safety of transportation and radioactive waste management.

70. The Russian Federation has also been actively contributing to training skilled national personnel for other countries and conducting scientific research, which are important elements of technical assistance activities.

71. Large-scale training efforts are an important part of the Russian programme. Following a decision taken in 2008, the Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute (which is known for its history of excellence in training experts) and a number of regional educational institutions formed the National Nuclear Research University.

72. We will be pleased to accept foreign students and experts for training and retraining for the national nuclear energy programmes of IAEA member States.

73. The Russian Federation is assisting developing countries that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in building accelerators and neutron generators; it also supplies neutron radiography units, gamma-ray treatment equipment, liquid nitrogen production units, ionizing radiation sources, and other equipment and materials. We are willing to look into the possibility of cooperating in building low- and medium-power reactors, including mobile nuclear power stations with long-life no-reload operation. Such stations could be run and fully controlled by a supplying State. The Russian Federation is ready to proceed with the construction of a 70 MW offshore nuclear power station capable of both producing electricity and desalinating water.

74. The Russian Federation is taking part in the IAEA programme to develop a network of regional international training and demonstration centres for reprocessing and storage of radioactive waste produced as a result of applying nuclear methods in health care, scientific research and industry.

75. The Russian Federation attaches utmost importance to developing cooperation with States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — namely, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus — in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This will establish the legal framework required for the implementation of specific bilateral projects.

76. The third Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, held in May 2009, highlighted the return of spent fuel from research reactors as a positive and effective practice. The repatriation of highly enriched uranium fuel from Russian- and American-designed research reactors in third countries takes place through cooperation between the Russian Federation and the United States with IAEA involvement. The Russian Federation supports the IAEA programme aimed at reducing the level of enrichment of nuclear fuel for research reactors to below 20 per cent. The implementation of this programme will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation of highly enriched uranium.

77. International cooperation will to a great extent determine the success of these costly projects, which often require the development of non-standard technological solutions but which are pressing from an environmental standpoint and in terms of nuclear and physical security. In this connection, the Russian Federation confirms its intention to become one of the donors to a project for the removal of spent nuclear fuel from the Vinča research reactor in Serbia. The Russian Federation has decided to assist Ukraine in enhancing safety at the Chernobyl nuclear power station and accelerating the decommissioning of the facility. To this end, in 2009 we donated $10 million to the Nuclear Safety Account and $7 million to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund.

78. As a practical contribution to strengthening safety, the Russian Federation has assisted Armenia in enhancing safety at the Armenian nuclear power station under the IAEA technical cooperation programme. We provided 240 million roubles for that purpose in 2008 and are participating very actively in the implementation of the Armenian projects.

79. Given the high level to which nuclear technology has been developed in the Russian Federation, we have declined virtually all technical assistance from IAEA through national projects.

Article V

80. In 1990, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declared a moratorium on nuclear testing. Since then, no nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in our country. We intend to pursue this course in the future. We hope that the other nuclear Powers will take a similar approach.

81. The Russian Federation ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2000. We remain committed to this Treaty, which makes an essential contribution to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We are convinced that a comprehensive and no-threshold ban on any nuclear explosions is an effective means of restraining the qualitative improvement of nuclear warheads.

82. Progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons depends to a great extent on ensuring that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty becomes universal and on the accession to it of all States possessing nuclear capability, that is, on the early entry into force of the Treaty and strict compliance with all its provisions.

83. We are making our contribution to the attainment of this objective. We are pursuing a consistent policy aimed at facilitating the early entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Our view is that a moratorium on nuclear testing, important as it may be, cannot be a substitute for the international legal obligations set out in the Treaty.

84. In addition to bilateral work, we consistently participate in relevant multilateral activities. Our country has been a consistent sponsor of the resolutions in support of the Treaty adopted for a number of years by the United Nations General Assembly. We attend the "Friends of the CTBT" meetings of Ministers for Foreign Affairs that take place biennially on the margins of the General Assembly. One important element of efforts to ensure the entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty convened biennially by the United Nations Secretary-General in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty. We participate actively in these conferences, the most recent of which was held in New York in 2009.

85. The Russian Federation fully supports the gradual and balanced creation of a verification mechanism within the framework of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We are working on establishing the Russian segment of the International Monitoring System (IMS) envisaged by the Treaty. In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, the Russian segment of IMS comprises 6 basic and 13 auxiliary seismic stations, as well as 4 infrasound stations, 8 radionuclide stations and 1 radionuclide laboratory (a total of 32 IMS facilities).

86. The Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) on measures regarding facilities in the International Monitoring System provided for in the Treaty, entered into force in 2006. The Agreement provides a reliable legal framework for expanding cooperation between the Russian Federation and the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, and also enables us to speed up work to create a Russian IMS segment — a key element of verification of compliance with the Treaty — and ensure its operation until the Treaty enters into force.

87. We are also actively cooperating with the efforts of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission to establish another part of the Treaty verification mechanism: the on-site inspection regime. Russian inspectors and observers participated in the integrated on-site inspection exercise conducted in Kazakhstan in 2008. This exercise was an important milestone in the establishment of a unique global CTBT verification mechanism.

Article VI

88. Recognizing that it has special responsibility, both as a nuclear Power and as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to meet its obligations on disarmament under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Russian Federation, in a spirit of goodwill, continues to carry out deep, irreversible and verifiable reductions of its strategic offensive arms.

89. The signing in Prague on 8 April 2010 of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was an important step in this direction.

90. This new Treaty replaces one of the most significant disarmament treaties in history: the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) of 31 July 1991, which expired on 4 December 2009.

91. START I performed a historic role in ensuring international peace, strategic stability and security. It laid the foundations for a qualitatively new atmosphere of trust, openness and predictability in the strategic offensive arms reduction process, which is now reflected in the new Treaty. The deep reductions undertaken by the two parties since the end of the Cold War have made the world more stable and secure and have dispelled the feeling of constant threat that was hanging over the people of our countries and others. They have allowed us to move from an era of "co-existence" to a stage of partnership and mutually beneficial cooperation, thus creating a completely different military and political environment in the world.

92. Under START I, the two parties undertook to reduce their number of deployed strategic delivery vehicles to no more than 1,600 each and the number of warheads attributed to them to no more than 6,000 each within seven years of the Treaty's entry into force. The Russian Federation fully met its arms reduction obligations and, by the verification date of 5 December 2001, it had actually reduced its aggregate number of deployed strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers) to 1,136 and the number of warheads attributed to them to 5,518.

93. Even though the Russian Federation had completely met its arms reduction obligations under START I, it continued to eliminate its strategic offensive arms. By 1 January 2010, it had eliminated some 1,600 ICBM and SLBM launchers, 3,100 ICBMs and SLBMs, 47 nuclear submarines and 67 heavy bombers. As at the beginning of this year, the Russian Federation had approximately 800 deployed delivery vehicles for strategic offensive arms and 3,900 warheads attributed to them under START I. A comparison of these figures with the data provided on article VI in our report to the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference shows the growing contribution of the Russian Federation to fulfilling its Treaty obligations.

94. The provisions of the new Treaty on strategic offensive arms reduction stipulate that each party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

- 700 for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers;
- 1,550 for warheads on them;
- 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers. This aggregate limit for deployed and non-deployed launchers and heavy bombers is thus established as a legal requirement in the Treaty. This makes it possible to limit the parties' "upload potential" (their capacity to swiftly build up the number of deployed warheads in times of crisis) and creates additional momentum for the elimination or conversion of the strategic offensive arms to be reduced.

95. With this Treaty, the Russian Federation and the United States have once again clearly demonstrated their desire for large-scale strategic offensive arms reductions. The parties have agreed to cut their aggregate number of warheads by one third (the "ceiling" under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions was 2,200 warheads) and to reduce the limit for strategic delivery vehicles by more than half (under START I the ceiling was 1,600, while the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions placed no limits on them).

96. While negotiating the new Treaty on strategic offensive arms, we were mindful that nuclear disarmament is impossible without taking into account current trends in the sphere of strategic defence weapons and that at present there are no restrictions on the deployment of strategic missile defence systems.

97. Once the new Treaty enters into force, the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions of 24 May 2002 between the Russian Federation and the United States will also cease to have effect. In fact the parties have already met their obligations under the latter Treaty.

98. Through the implementation of the 1987 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles, 1,846 land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500-5,500 km and 825 launchers for such missiles were destroyed. In all, over 3,000 nuclear warheads with a total yield of over 500,000 kilotons have been deactivated. We have put forward a proposal to make the obligations under that Treaty universal.

99. In terms of nuclear non-proliferation, the withdrawal by the Russian Federation of tactical nuclear weapons from Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics to its own territory is highly significant.

100. Only now, years later, is it possible to truly appreciate the scope and extraordinary complexity of this operation. The Russian Federation withdrew all tactical nuclear weapons to its territory in a relatively short time while also duly ensuring their technical safety and secure storage.

101. Russian nuclear weapons are under reliable control. The effectiveness of this control is enhanced by both organizational and technical measures. Since 1991, the total number of nuclear weapons storage facilities has been reduced fourfold, and the number of nuclear weapons stockpiles has been cut more than fivefold.

102. The Russian Federation has developed and implemented a range of measures to counter terrorist acts, and comprehensive security inspections of all nuclear- and radiation-hazardous facilities are conducted regularly.

103. 2009 marked the fifteenth anniversary of implementation of the Agreement concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons between the Governments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, also known as the Megatons to Megawatts programme. So far under this Agreement, over 350 tons of weapons-grade uranium have been irreversibly converted into low-enriched uranium. That is equivalent to 14,000 nuclear warheads and represents about 76 per cent of the highly enriched uranium intended for conversion under the Agreement.

104. This year, under the Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation signed in April 2010, the last reactor in the Russian Federation producing weapons-grade plutonium was halted. The Russian Federation will dispose of 34 tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium through irradiation in a BN-800 reactor.

105. The above-mentioned facts and the practical steps taken by the Russian Federation to meet its obligations confirm our willingness to follow a steady course towards genuine nuclear disarmament in compliance with the requirements of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Article VII

106. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is one of the main tools for the consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole and the Non-Proliferation Treaty in particular. By creating nuclear-weapon-free zones and thereby implementing article VII of the Treaty, States are in fact promoting the strengthening of regional and international stability and security and the enhancement of mutual trust. The Russian Federation consistently supports this process and cooperates with States' efforts to establish and formalize the status of such zones.

107. Considering the concern and desire of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to obtain legally binding assurances which would rule out

the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them, the Russian Federation, by signing the relevant Protocols, has provided such legally binding security assurances to all States which are parties to nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements. These assurances were confirmed by the Russian Federation under Security Council resolution 984 (1995). We confirm these commitments once again, as well as our intention to follow the same course as new nuclear-free zones are established.

108. The international community has gained considerable experience in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. We consider it vitally important to ensure that agreements institutionalizing them are fully compliant with the established principles and parameters for establishing such zones and with international law. Any breach of these requirements may cause complications with regard to the legal recognition of nuclear-weapon-free zones by nuclear Powers and their provision of the related security assurances. In this connection, we note the fundamental role of the principles and guidelines on the establishment and legalization of new nuclear-weapon-free zones adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1999.

109. The Russian Federation welcomes the 40 years of effective functioning of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the first international legal instrument establishing the nuclear-free status of an extensive and densely populated region, as well as its contribution to the process of further establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in the world.

110. The Russian Federation strictly complies with its commitments under Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which sets out the obligations of the nuclear Powers with respect to the States in the zone.

111. The historical significance of this instrument is that it established a precedent for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones that has largely determined the parameters for that process in other parts of the world.

112. We welcome the entry into force on 21 March 2009 of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk). We are convinced that the Treaty will contribute to the strengthening of peace and stability in the region. Apart from the fact that the Treaty establishes the first nuclear-free zone in the northern hemisphere, which in itself is highly significant, it also sets out an obligation for the States parties to bring into effect an additional protocol to an IAEA safeguards agreement within 18 months after the entry into force of the Treaty. This is the first time that the application of additional protocols has been made a legal obligation. We consider that this is an important step in the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and the consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

113. We note that the Treaty of Semipalatinsk and its Protocol providing security assurances from nuclear Powers to the States parties to the Treaty were developed in full compliance with international law and take into account the 1999 recommendations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

114. The signature and ratification of the Protocol by all five nuclear-weapon States can ensure *the full and effective* functioning of the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone. We believe that easing States' concerns about the Treaty and its Protocol would assist the Central Asian States in furthering their consultations with States

that harbour doubts. The Russian Federation is prepared to cooperate further with such efforts.

115. The situation with respect to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, at a time when stability in the Middle East is important for both regional and international security, is a highly complicated matter. As in the past, there are States in the region which have not placed their nuclear capabilities under IAEA safeguards and which are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A number of States are not parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Biological Weapons Convention.

116. We believe that the optimal means of reaching a comprehensive solution to non-proliferation issues in the Middle East and achieving peace and stability in the region would be the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, as set out in the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and reaffirmed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

117. The Russian Federation is committed to the provisions of the 1995 resolution. We are convinced that the implementation of this resolution in its entirety would contribute to strengthening the security of all Middle Eastern States and would certainly strengthen international security as well. In this connection, in 2009 at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, the Russian Federation proposed that specific steps should be taken to implement the 1995 resolution and proposed a set of measures that might assist in advancing towards its implementation, in the first instance through the establishment of dialogue between all the States concerned. Our proposal was to hold an international conference or meeting with the participation of all the States concerned — the Middle Eastern States above all — in order to consider the prospects for implementing the resolution in its entirety.

118. We also believe that it would be appropriate to appoint a special coordinator who would be authorized to hold consultations on this issue with the States of the Middle East region and who, during the course of the further review process, would present a report on the results of this work.

119. Moreover, in order to create a favourable climate for progress towards the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, all States in the region must sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The States on which the Treaty's entry into force depends could consider immediately the possibility of ratifying the Treaty as a first step in that process and a confidence-building measure.

120. As another confidence-building measure, we proposed that all Middle Eastern States should consider the possibility of voluntarily forgoing the establishment or development of capabilities in uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, while emphasizing that we do not question the right of States to produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We believe that the best guarantee for the exercise of this right would be through multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.

121. Undoubtedly, a key component for establishing a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery is to place under comprehensive

IAEA safeguards all nuclear facilities in the region that are not under such safeguards.

122. The Russian Federation welcomes the entry into force on 15 July 2009 of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). Our country signed Protocols I and II to the Treaty in 1996. In order to further assist the efforts of the African States along these lines, the Russian Federation has initiated the process of preparing for the ratification of the Protocols which it has signed.

123. The Russian Federation is ready to continue the process of settling the remaining issues relating to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok) through dialogue between the nuclear Powers and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Articles VIII, IX and X

124. The Russian Federation is pleased to note that 190 States are now parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which makes it one of the most widely represented international agreements. In order to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty, the Russian Federation is working actively at both the bilateral and the multilateral levels to have India, Pakistan and Israel become parties to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. While strictly observing the provisions of article IX, the Russian Federation has not changed its position as regards the presence of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. We continue, in accordance with the Treaty, to consider them non-nuclear-weapon States and expect them to comply with Security Council resolution 1172 (1998).

125. As regards the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its withdrawal from the Treaty, the Russian Federation is taking an active part in the process of settling the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula.

126. Recognizing its responsibility as a party to and depositary of the Treaty, the Russian Federation underlines the exceptional sensitivity of the issue of the withdrawal of States from the Treaty. We consider it necessary to minimize the possibility of situations in which States refuse to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty. We believe that making States more accountable for decisions to withdraw from the Treaty in accordance with article X could be one of the ways to strengthen the Treaty. This objective could be achieved by agreeing on a number of political measures and procedures which would be applied in such cases. However, such actions should not lead to a revision or reopening of the Treaty text.

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

4 May 2010

Original: English

New York, 3-28 May 2010

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Brazil

1. Brazil decided to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1998,[1] taking into consideration the easing of international tensions following the end of the cold war and the consolidation of the Treaty as the main international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, by virtue of the adoption of a strengthened, forward-looking review process at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

2. In doing so, Brazil sought to join other parties to the Treaty in focusing its efforts on the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals as the only means of correcting the built-in asymmetry between States parties and the full and definitive achievement of the Treaty's goals.

3. The Congress of Brazil approved the country's accession to the Treaty on the understanding that effective measures would be taken with a view to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as stated in the Legislative Decree[2] that approved the Treaty in 1998.

Article I

4. Brazil considers that non-proliferation efforts are but a means of fulfilling the highest aspirations and purposes of the Treaty, which are aimed at avoiding the risk of a nuclear war and achieving the goal of a safer, nuclear-weapon-free world. States possessing nuclear weapons have primary responsibility for avoiding the risk of nuclear conflagration and fulfilling the disarmament commitments made under the Treaty.

5. More than 40 years after the Treaty was concluded, and 20 years after the end of the cold war, the continued existence of nuclear weapons, both within and outside the Treaty's regime, runs counter to its provisions and remains a powerful stimulus

[1] Act 2864 of 7 December 1998.

[2] Legislative Decree 65 of 2 July 1998.

Please recycle

for proliferation. As long as some States possess such weapons, other States will be tempted to acquire or develop them, just as proliferation occurred prior to the existence of the Treaty, generating the nuclear-weapon States recognized under the Treaty.

6. Brazil is not a member of any military alliance involving nuclear arsenals, nor is it protected by so-called nuclear umbrellas, which involve the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of some nuclear-weapon States.

7. Proliferation both within and outside the Treaty is stimulated not only by the existence of nuclear weapons, but also by the ongoing qualitative development of such weapons and their delivery systems. It is also spurred by doctrines that seek to justify and perpetuate a purported usefulness and need for such weapons and which admit the possible use of nuclear weapons against States not possessing nuclear weapons.

8. A world in which nuclear weapons are allowed will remain intrinsically insecure, under the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear annihilation itself. This, along with the moral unacceptability of any weapons of mass destruction, should provide the strongest argument for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

9. Therefore, the five nuclear-weapon States are called upon to undo the effects of their original development, proliferation and accumulation of nuclear weapons by fulfilling their unique responsibility for achieving the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

10. Confidence that nuclear weapons are to be totally eliminated in the foreseeable future thus provides the most effective and credible bulwark against further proliferation.

11. Non-proliferation concerns cannot hamper the inalienable right to the development, research, production and use of nuclear energy or international cooperation related to peaceful nuclear activities. Non-proliferation concerns cannot be invoked as a pretext to impose additional obligations or new restrictions on States parties to the Treaty that have already forgone the nuclear-weapons option. Any new non-proliferation commitments, including in terms of enhanced verification procedures, must be considered in the light of the Treaty's overall implementation, particularly with regard to the nuclear-weapon States' nuclear disarmament obligations.

Article II

12. The Constitution of Brazil[3] expressly forbids all non-peaceful nuclear activities. Consequently, and consistent with Brazil's obligations under the Treaty, nuclear weapons and all activities related to them are prohibited within its territory.

13. Brazil does not possess nor has it ever developed nuclear weapons, and has always fulfilled its nuclear non-proliferation commitments. Legislation in force (see below) prohibits and prevents the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means of any nuclear explosive device in its territory.

[3] Article XXI, paragraph XXIII (a): "All nuclear activity within the national territory shall only be admitted for peaceful purposes and subject to approval by the National Congress".

Furthermore, Brazil abstains from carrying out, promoting or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or from participating, in any way, in any of the said activities. Moreover, Brazil is not a party to any military alliance or security system that foresees the possible use of nuclear weapons.

14. Brazil is concerned about possible non-compliance within the Treaty, as well as instances of proliferation outside the Treaty. Ensuring full compliance with the Treaty by its States parties and seeking its universality are goals that must be pursued in parallel. Complacency with proliferation outside the Treaty runs counter to efforts aiming at strengthening its regime and achieving non-proliferation goals and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

15. Brazil shares the concern about the risk that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and related technologies may fall into the hands of unauthorized non-State actors or terrorists. Such risk highlights not only the need to promote nuclear safety and security, but also, most importantly, to make steady progress towards completing nuclear disarmament and outlawing those weapons entirely. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is obviously no deterrent to terrorist threats. Only the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction can ensure that such weapons will never be obtained by unauthorized non-State actors or terrorists.

16. Besides the obligations derived from the Treaty and the incorporation into its national legislation of the guidelines adopted in the context of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Brazil has enacted legislation for the control of every nuclear activity in its territory, defining specific penalties for activities not authorized by the Government in this field. This legislation, set out below, is also in line with Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2009):

(a) Act 4118 of 27 August 1962 created the National Commission for Nuclear Energy (CNEN). It determines that all activities related to the nuclear field are a monopoly of the State. It establishes that control of these activities is incumbent upon CNEN. It defines as a crime against national security the clandestine export or import of nuclear materials (article 39). Furthermore, it prohibits the possession or transfer of nuclear materials, including by-products, without explicit authorization from CNEN, even within the domestic market (article 40);

(b) Act 6453 of 17 October 1977 established civil responsibility for nuclear damages and criminal responsibility for acts related to nuclear activities. It defined and penalized the production, processing, supplying and use of nuclear material without necessary authorization or for other purposes than those allowed by law (article 20), as well as the export and import of nuclear material without due official licence (article 25). If related to terrorist acts, the penalties associated with these offences are cumulative to those provided for crimes of terrorism;

(c) Act 1065 of 24 February 1994 approved the 1991 Agreement between the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Argentine Republic, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)[4] and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards. The

[4] ABACC was created by the Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, signed in Guadalajara on 18 July 1991. The Agreement established the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, implemented by ABACC.

Quadripartite Agreement is a result of a historic, successful political process of integration and confidence-building between Brazil and Argentina. The two countries decided to follow an unprecedented path in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by creating ABACC and submitting all their nuclear facilities to IAEA and ABACC comprehensive safeguards. The satisfactory implementation of this unique safeguards system is recognized by IAEA and ABACC in their annual reports, without ever having given rise to any doubt with respect to the complete fulfilment of commitments and obligations in accordance with all relevant international instruments on nuclear non-proliferation to which Brazil and Argentina are parties;

(d) Act 1246 of 16 September 1994 approved the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and resolutions 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990; 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991; and 290 (E-VII) of 26 August 1992, adopted at the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL);

(e) Act 9112 of 10 October 1995 established controls on international exports of materials and services with possible application to weapons of mass destruction. It defines as sensitive goods all those with dual use in the nuclear, chemical and biological fields. The implementation of controls is supervised by an Interministerial Commission for Export Control of Sensitive Goods, established within the presidency of the Republic.

Article III

17. All nuclear material in Brazil is accounted for by the National Commission for Nuclear Energy, established in 1962. CNEN regulates and supervises all nuclear activities in Brazil. It is also responsible for primary interaction with ABACC and for the implementation of the 1991 Quadripartite Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, ABACC and IAEA.

18. ABACC is responsible for the administration and application of the Common System of Accounting and Control of all nuclear materials in Brazil and Argentina, with a view to ensuring that no material is diverted or used in an inappropriate or unauthorized manner, in conformity with the purposes of the bilateral Agreement that created the Agency.

19. The Quadripartite Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, ABACC and IAEA subjects all nuclear materials in Brazil to IAEA comprehensive safeguards. The physical monitoring of nuclear activities, as mandated under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, is conducted by both IAEA and ABACC under the terms of the Quadripartite Agreement. Such monitoring started before Brazil's accession to the Treaty in 1998.

20. All 25 nuclear facilities in Brazil are placed under international ABACC and IAEA comprehensive safeguards, including one uranium isotopic enrichment laboratory and one uranium enrichment pilot plant that are located at military facilities. About 60 IAEA and ABACC on-site inspections are conducted every year.

21. Cooperation between the international safeguards system (IAEA), the regional system (ABACC) and the national system under CNEN has contributed substantially to enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Brazil. Brazil has repeatedly stressed the need for increased integration of the implementation of safeguards at the international and regional levels. Brazil attaches great importance to the cooperation between ABACC and IAEA with a view to

avoiding any duplication of effort and achieving cost-effectiveness in the application of safeguards in Brazil and Argentina.

22. The satisfactory implementation of the unique, comprehensive safeguards system in place in Brazil and Argentina is clearly recognized by IAEA and ABACC in their annual reports, without ever having given rise to any form of doubt with respect to the complete fulfilment of the commitments and obligations of the two countries in accordance with all relevant international instruments on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament to which they are parties: the 1991 Quadripartite Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, IAEA and ABACC; the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco; the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty; and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

23. That impeccable track record has prompted the Government of Brazil to state, in its national defence strategy,[5] that it will not adhere to increased safeguards commitments that are additional to those prescribed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and geared to imposing new restrictions on States not possessing nuclear weapons, unless the nuclear-weapon States have advanced in the Treaty's main objective: their own nuclear disarmament. Brazil has developed uranium enrichment technology indigenously and, like other States, is determined to continue the development of nuclear-fuel-related technologies and, in so doing, exercise its right to protect related proprietary and commercial information. Moreover, Brazil has a nuclear-propelled-submarine project, the completion of which will imply the start of negotiations with IAEA for the application of comprehensive safeguards on the nuclear material to be utilized.

24. Since the end of 2005, Brazil, having accepted the invitation of IAEA, has participated in the Member State support programme to provide voluntary technical support to the IAEA Department of Safeguards. The Brazilian support programme cooperates with the IAEA Department of Safeguards by providing human resources and logistical support for the application of safeguards with a view to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation. The Brazilian support programme includes participation in field tests and the evaluation of new technologies as requested by IAEA for its safeguards applications, the training of safeguards personnel, the analysis of safeguards issues and the provision of human resources, including experts and consultants, to work directly with the secretariat.

Article IV

25. The inalienable right to the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was not established by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, since it pre-existed the Treaty. The Treaty excludes the possibility of any interpretation that would affect this right, recognized in article IV, which plays a pivotal role under the Treaty, together with the obligations contained in articles I, II and VI. Respect for this right and the undertaking by States parties to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes are key elements of the effectiveness and credibility of the Treaty regime. Therefore, any proposals aimed at limiting the exercise of this inalienable right should be firmly rejected.

26. The development and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is a fundamental principle enshrined in the Constitution of Brazil. Nuclear technologies

[5] Executive Decree 6703 of 18 December 2008.

are an indispensable tool in modern economies and play an important role in global endeavours to reduce carbon emissions and combat climate change. International cooperation in the nuclear field is a key component of efforts aimed at sustainable economic development. IAEA plays an essential role in that respect.

27. Brazil is a founding member of IAEA. Since 1957, it has participated in an active and constructive manner in the work of the Agency with the aim of strengthening the exercise of the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and promoting international cooperation in this field. Brazil receives significant benefits from international cooperation and also assists other States by providing technical cooperation on nuclear science and nuclear technology applications. Brazil maintains nearly 20 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, with both developed and developing countries. Brazil attaches particular relevance to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, in which it is an active participant, as both a beneficiary and a donor country.

28. Under the auspices of the Programme, Brazil sends 50 technicians for training abroad every year. Furthermore, it offers more than 40 scholarships for nationals of Latin American and Caribbean, African and Asian countries to receive training at Brazilian institutions and facilities. Brazil also makes available about two dozen nuclear specialists every year to serve in the context of IAEA expert missions abroad.

29. Since the 1980s, Brazil has been an active participant in the Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean (ARCAL), mainly as a donor country, both by making available scholarships at its nuclear institutions for the training of Latin American and Caribbean experts and by making available Brazilian experts and instructors to assist other countries in the region.

30. Brazil operates two nuclear power plants, and a third one is under a licensing process. Altogether, they will generate approximately 3,000 megawatts. Brazil is endowed with the world's sixth-largest uranium ore reserves, with 70 per cent of the territory still to be prospected, and has developed wide-ranging production capabilities, from the mining and processing of uranium to UO_2 and isotopic uranium enrichment, all the way to nuclear fuel element production. Uranium enrichment activities were started in 1987 at the Aramar Experimental Centre, which developed the technology indigenously. The industrial enrichment facility and the fuel fabrication plant, located at Resende, are now fully operational.

31. Besides electrical-power generation, Brazil's nuclear activities extend to wide-ranging applications in medicine, agriculture, industry and environmental protection. More than 700 hospitals and clinics use nuclear techniques in medical applications, including radiotherapy and nuclear medicine. More than 450 clinical facilities apply radiopharmaceutical products in over 2.5 million medical procedures every year. Furthermore, there are approximately 200 specialized laboratories which conduct radioimmune assays. Nearly 700 industrial plants use radioisotopes, for instance, in food irradiation, polymerization, industrial radiography and oil-well operations.

Article V

32. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference affirms that the provisions of article V are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Brazil participated actively in negotiations on the Treaty, signed it on the day it was opened for signature — 24 September 1996 — and ratified it on 24 July 1998. Since then, Brazil has been actively participating in the work of the Vienna-based Preparatory Commission for the future Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

33. In line with that Treaty as well as with previous commitments made under the above-mentioned bilateral and quadripartite nuclear agreements signed with Argentina, ABACC and IAEA in 1991, Brazil revoked its reservations under the Tlatelolco Treaty concerning peaceful nuclear explosions, thus relinquishing the right to conduct them.

34. Brazil has consistently called for the universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and welcomes the fact that, so far, 182 States have signed and 151 have ratified the Treaty. However, it continues to call on States, particularly the nine States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty that have not yet done so, to ratify it as soon as possible.

Article VI

35. As highlighted in the preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war, States parties need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war. The risk of a global nuclear war did not disappear with the end of the cold war. Whereas one might assume that that risk has decreased, the risk of a nuclear attack, either by design or accident, persists, and may even have increased.

36. Full compliance with article VI is thus key to the attainment of the Treaty's goals. Forty years after the Treaty's entry into force, and 20 years after the end of the cold war, it is disconcerting that it has not yet been possible to give concrete expression to achieving nuclear disarmament at an early date, as stipulated in article VI.

37. The International Court of Justice, in its landmark 1996 advisory opinion, stressed the need to implement article VI fully and completely, stating that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

38. The achievement of the objectives of the Treaty is contingent upon addressing the issues of disarmament and non-proliferation in an interrelated and mutually reinforcing way. Article VI-related decisions taken at Treaty Review Conferences are the multilaterally agreed framework for the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures. The forward-looking, realistic action programme adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, known as the "thirteen steps", is the agreed blueprint for nuclear disarmament and must be implemented forthwith. Regrettably, however, most of those pledges remain on paper.

39. The last decade did not see meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament. Particularly disturbing trends have continued or were aggravated, such as the giving

of greater prominence or ambiguities to nuclear weapons in security strategies; the persistence of nuclear doctrines that admit first use, including against States that do not possess nuclear weapons; studies on the possible deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons; plans related to their tactical uses, including against conventional forces; ongoing research on nuclear explosives, including "subcritical" tests; readiness to resume full-scale explosive tests; and new investment in the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Such developments undermine the credibility of the Treaty and stoke the flames of proliferation by suggesting that nuclear weapons are and will remain indispensable to the security needs of some States.

40. Brazil is convinced that nuclear weapons do not enhance, but rather diminish, the security of all States, including of those that believe they are more secure by virtue of possessing such weapons or of participating in nuclear-weapon-based military alliances. Reducing stockpiles will not lead to true nuclear disarmament as long as nuclear weapons are seen as strategic assets and qualitative arms races continue, although in less visible or disguised forms.

41. The "unequivocal undertaking" by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, must be taken in all seriousness. Nuclear-weapon States are called upon to demonstrate an unflinching commitment to the speedy implementation of the agreed path towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. Although unilateral and bilateral reductions are an indispensable part of the overall nuclear disarmament effort, they cannot substitute for a framework of multilaterally agreed measures. The time is therefore ripe for nuclear disarmament measures that are comprehensive, irreversible and verifiable, within a phased process leading to the total elimination of nuclear arsenals.

Article VII

42. Brazil is a founding member of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in an inhabited region of the world, established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was adopted by all Latin American and Caribbean States in 1967. The Treaty, which predates the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself, has been ratified by every country in the region and is considered a model for all other initiatives that have resulted in nuclear-weapon-free zones.

43. Brazil strongly supports the implementation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and considers that they play an increasingly important role in efforts to bring about a nuclear-weapon-free world. In that spirit, Brazil participated in the first Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held in April 2005 in Mexico City, where the Treaty of Tlatelolco was signed, and in the second Conference, held in New York on 30 April 2010. Today, 113 countries belong to nuclear-weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.

44. In 2004, the States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco renewed their call to the nuclear-weapon States to review the negative security assurances extended to them under the auspices of the Protocols to the Treaty. Unfortunately, the nuclear-weapon States' response was once again disappointing, inasmuch as they have chosen to retain their reservations to the Protocols. Brazil, both bilaterally and as a State party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, continues to call upon the nuclear-weapon States to

review their position on this issue, with a view to providing the members of such zones with unequivocal assurances against the use of nuclear weapons.

45. Together with New Zealand, Brazil has since 1996 sponsored a resolution in the General Assembly entitled "Nuclear-Weapon-Free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas", which recognizes that nuclear-weapon-free zones are gradually freeing the entire southern hemisphere of nuclear weapons. The resolution also affirms the contribution of this effort to the strengthening of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime, as an example to the nuclear-weapon States and to those States that have joined them in nuclear-weapon-based military alliances. In this regard, the resolution calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to support the process of nuclear disarmament and to work expeditiously for the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

Article VIII

46. The strengthened review process agreed in 1995 ascribed a forward-looking role to the review conferences. Among other significant achievements of that process was the adoption in 2000 of the thirteen practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. Insufficient results over the last decade make it even more important, at the 2010 Review Conference, to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty's accountability, credibility and sustainability over the long run. Confidence in the strengthened review process as a guarantor of treaty implementation should not be allowed to erode.

47. The decision taken at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference to extend the Treaty indefinitely does not signify that nuclear weapons are to be retained indefinitely. Such a misconception would encourage nuclear proliferation and defeat the Treaty's goal of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Treaty must logically and ultimately be superseded by a convention on the elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons.

48. At the 2000 Review Conference, Brazil and its partners (Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) in the New Agenda Coalition, established in 1998, worked closely on the elaboration and discussion of the thirteen practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts on nuclear disarmament, which came to be the most important achievement of that Conference.

49. In 2005, regrettably, it was not possible to reach consensus on a final document. Ambassador Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte was elected President of the Review Conference, as a signal of Brazil's credentials and commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and made every effort to lead the Conference to a positive outcome.

50. As in the other multilateral disarmament-related forums, mainly the Conference on Disarmament, the First Committee of the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission, Brazil participated actively in the three Preparatory Committees (2007, 2008 and 2009) leading up to the eighth Review Conference, at which it will occupy one of the vice-presidencies.

51. Brazil considers that the challenges facing the implementation of the Treaty are of a political nature and not the result of deficiencies in the machinery or administration of the Treaty. The creation of new bureaucratic structures seems unnecessary and could duplicate work already done at the United Nations and

IAEA. Although the strengthened review process could always be streamlined and made more efficient, it is sufficient for the purpose of ascertaining the full implementation of the Treaty. Political will by all parties is of the essence, as was the case at the 2000 Review Conference.

Article IX

52. The universalization of the Treaty remains an important challenge for the future of the Treaty. Brazil has repeatedly called on those States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it without delay as non-nuclear-weapon States parties. The establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East and South Asia, would greatly contribute to the integrity and sustainability of the Treaty regime.

53. Non-State parties should refrain from any action that might undermine the fulfilment of the objectives of the Treaty as well as of relevant United Nations resolutions. At the same time, unequivocal, concrete steps by the nuclear-weapon States to expedite nuclear disarmament and achieve the total elimination of nuclear arsenals in the foreseeable future would play a major part in encouraging nuclear-weapon-capable States outside the Treaty to reconsider their options and join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

Article X

54. Brazil considers that the decision to withdraw from the Treaty — as from any treaty freely subscribed to — is a sovereign right recognized under international law. The indefinite extension of the Treaty adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference did not alter the procedure laid out in article X concerning withdrawal, in case a State party "decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country".

55. Notwithstanding the already rigorous procedure established under article X, and in view of the Treaty's relevance to international peace and security, the case could be made for a deeper and broader consideration of any announcement of intention from a State party to withdraw from the Treaty. This would allow for an open and transparent discussion in the Security Council on the causes invoked as the basis for such an intention. The objective is to avoid, to the extent possible, resorting to article X, especially if it is clear that such withdrawal is associated with the intent to engage in nuclear proliferation or in any other way to erode the Treaty's effectiveness. Such consideration should take into account the implications that actions discouraging withdrawal might have for legitimate rights under other treaties and agreements, including those of a commercial nature.